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Abstract
We theoretically and empirically examine the relationship between natural resource revenues
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which contract enforcement is low and decreasing in resource revenues when political insti-
tutions are poor, but high otherwise. As poor contract enforcement leads to low ﬁnancial
development, the model predicts that resource revenues hinder ﬁnancial development in coun-
tries with poor political institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better political
institutions. We test our theoretical predictions systematically using panel data covering the
period 1970 to 2005 and 133 countries. Our estimates conﬁrm our theoretical predictions.
Our main results hold when we control country ﬁxed eﬀects, time varying common shocks,
income and various additional covariates. They are also robust to alternative estimation
techniques, various alternative measures of ﬁnancial development and political institutions,
as well as across diﬀerent samples and data frequencies. We present further evidence using
panel data covering the period 1870 to 1940 and 31 countries.
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11 Introduction
Are natural resource revenues a curse or a blessing for ﬁnancial development? An incum-
bent government endowed with natural resource revenues may ﬁnd it easier to invest in
contract enforcement and the rule of law, which may be important for both economic and
ﬁnancial development. But, on the other hand, an incumbent government does not need
a prospering manufacturing sector to enrich itself if it has easy access to resource rents.
Thus it may put less emphasis on improving contract enforcement, such that ﬁnancial de-
velopment may end up being lower. In this paper, we take a closer look at the relationship
between natural resource revenues and ﬁnancial development. In particular, we investigate
both theoretically and empirically whether and how the quality of political institutions
aﬀects this relationship.
In the theoretical part, we present a stylized politico-economic model of an economy
with an incumbent government, many citizens, and a ﬁrm. The ﬁrm hires labor and
borrows capital from the citizens in order to produce ﬁnal goods. After production and
wage payments, it decides whether or not to pay back the citizens’ capital and its interest
debt. If it fails to pay back capital and interest debt, then a share of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt net
of wage payments is conﬁscated. This share measures the level of contract enforcement
or, more generally, the quality of contracting institutions. Citizens prefer lending less
capital to the ﬁrm if the level of contract enforcement is low. The incumbent government
chooses the level of contract enforcement as well as the corruption level. We assume
that a trade-oﬀ between the two exists, e.g., because establishing and promoting contract
enforcement requires resources that could otherwise be appropriated.1 After the incumbent
government’s policy choice and the production of ﬁnal goods, the citizens can try to oust
the incumbent government in midterm elections. If they try, they are successful only with a
1There is a similar mechanism in the model of Caselli (2006) where the government can use resources
for private consumption purposes or for public investments that may trigger industrialization. Further
mechanisms leading to a trade-oﬀ between contract enforcement and corruption are discussed in section 2.
2certain probability, which increases in the quality of political institutions. The incumbent
government gets the oﬃcial salary and corruption revenues if and only if it remains in
oﬃce. Citizens are best oﬀ with zero corruption and strong contract enforcement.
In equilibrium, the incumbent government chooses high corruption and low contract
enforcement in the presence of high natural resource revenues and weak political institu-
tions. As a result citizens lend less capital to the ﬁrm and the economy experiences low
ﬁnancial development. But when political institutions are strong, the incumbent govern-
ment chooses strong contract enforcement, independently of resource revenues, which leads
to high ﬁnancial development. Our model thus predicts that natural resource revenues hin-
der ﬁnancial development in countries with poor political institutions, but not in countries
with comparatively better political institutions.
In the empirical part, we test our theoretical prediction systematically using a reduced
form model and panel data covering the periods 1970 to 2005 and 1870 to 1940, and
133 and 31 countries, respectively. Our ﬁxed eﬀect and instrumental variables estimates
conﬁrm that the relationship between natural resource revenues and ﬁnancial development
depends on the quality of political institutions. In particular, we ﬁnd that resource revenues
are negatively associated with ﬁnancial development in countries that have an average
POLITY2 score of around 8 or less over the period 1970 to 2005. Our main results hold
when we control for the eﬀects of log income, time varying common shocks and various
additional covariates. We notice that the eﬀect is a demonstrable empirical fact even
after controlling for possible Dutch Disease eﬀects by using terms of trade and trends in
commodity prices. It is also robust to various alternative measures of ﬁnancial development
and political institutions, as well as across diﬀerent samples and data frequencies. Evidence
for the 1870 to 1940 period is weaker as we get statistically signiﬁcant estimates only when
a democracy dummy from Polity IV is used. Using cross-sectional data we further present
evidence that is consistent with our theoretical model according to which natural resources
3rents hinder ﬁnancial development in the presence of weak political institutions by lowering
contract enforcement and the quality of contracting institutions.
We make the following contributions in this paper. First, we present a theoretical
model that demonstrates why we should expect the eﬀect of natural resource revenues on
ﬁnancial development to depend on the quality of political institutions. Second, using a
reduced form econometric model and panel data for the period 1970 to 2005 covering 133
countries, we show that the eﬀect of natural resource revenues on ﬁnancial development
indeed depends on the quality of political institutions. It is noteworthy that the use of
panel data is a signiﬁcant departure from most existing studies on natural resources or
ﬁnancial development, as they typically present results driven by cross-country variation.
Third, we also ﬁnd support (even though not robust) for our model prediction using panel
data for the period 1870 to 1940 and 31 countries. To the best of our knowledge, no other
empirical studies on natural resources or ﬁnancial development use panel data for this early
period.
There is a large literature on the causes of ﬁnancial development. However, the lit-
erature that focuses on the eﬀect of natural resources on ﬁnancial development is rather
small. Beck et al. (2003) are perhaps the ﬁrst to establish an explicit link between natural
resources and ﬁnancial development. Their endowment theory of ﬁnancial development
runs as follows: Resource endowment and disease environment encountered by the coloniz-
ers inﬂuenced the quality and nature of the colonial institutions they erected. In natural
resource abundant countries the initial distribution of wealth favored the elite and they
erected extractive institutions (see Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 1997). In countries with un-
favorable disease environment the colonizers decided not to settle and erected extractive
institutions (see Acemoglu et al., 2001). These extractive institutions characterized by
weak property rights and contract enforcement persisted over time and continue to nega-
tively inﬂuence ﬁnancial development and economic development. Beck et al. (2003) ﬁnd
4that the endowment theory explains the majority of the cross-country variation in ﬁnancial
development using a cross-section sample of 70 former colonies. Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) show that endowment impacts on ﬁnancial development through property rights
institutions (which protect citizens from expropriation by those in power) and not through
contracting institutions (which regulate transactions among private citizens). In contrast,
we focus on the eﬀects of current natural resource rents on ﬁnancial development and how
the quality of political institutions inﬂuences this relationship. We show that resource
rents coupled with weak political institutions are a hindrance to ﬁnancial development.
Initial endowment, initial property rights institutions, and initial political institutions
are likely to be correlated (Engerman et al. 1998). They are also likely to be persistent.
Therefore, a valid question would be whether we are picking up the eﬀects of initial en-
dowment and property rights institutions on ﬁnancial development, and not the eﬀects of
political institutions. As we use country ﬁxed eﬀects, it is clear that our results cannot be
driven by initial endowment. Further we test the robustness of our results by explicitly
controlling for property rights institutions, as measured by expropriation risk and execu-
tive constraints. Our results remain robust. Therefore the eﬀect that we identify is over
and above any eﬀect that resource endowment may have on ﬁnancial development through
property rights institutions.
In a related paper Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose the interest group theory of
ﬁnancial development. Their theory predicts that incumbent ﬁnanciers are likely to use
their market power to oppose ﬁnancial development in order to avoid competition. Further,
they predict that incumbent ﬁnanciers opposition will be weaker in the presence of trade
and ﬁnancial openness. They ﬁnd evidence in support of their theory using data from 24
countries and selected years from the period 1913 to 1999. Baltagi et al. (2009) provide
further evidence that trade and ﬁnancial openness promote ﬁnancial development.2 Our
2Moreover Chinn and Ito (2006) ﬁnd evidence that ﬁnancial openness promotes equity market devel-
5theory is related to Rajan and Zingales’, but in ours it is the incumbent government rather
than incumbent ﬁnanciers who are responsible for depressed ﬁnancial markets in certain
circumstances. Moreover we show that our empirical results hold when we control for trade
and ﬁnancial openness.
Our paper is also related to further contributions on the determinants of ﬁnancial devel-
opment.3 La Porta et al. (1998) show that legal origin is a good predictor of the eﬃciency
of the legal system in protecting private property rights and enforcing contracts. They ﬁnd
that on the average British common law countries are likely to have a better developed
legal system which promotes ﬁnancial development. Guiso et al. (2004) in contrast argue
that social capital and informal rules that govern social interaction plays a crucial role in
ﬁnancial development. By using country ﬁxed eﬀects, we indirectly control for the legal
origin theory and the social capital theory of ﬁnancial development.
Further, our paper is related to the resource curse literature,4 in particular to those
studies that look at how the eﬀects of natural resource revenues on corruption, rent seeking
and economic development depend on (economic or political) institutions (e.g., Hodler,
2006; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Olsson, 2007; Andersen and Aslaksen,
2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). More broadly, our paper is also related to the large
literatures on ﬁnance and development,5 and institutions and development (e.g., Acemoglu
et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Bhattacharyya, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical
model, and section 3 derives the equilibrium and some comparative static results. Section
4 discusses our empirical strategy and the data. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence
and various robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
opment in countries with a sound legal systems.
3See Beck and Levine (2005) for a survey of this literature.
4See van der Ploeg (2008) for a survey of this literature.
5See Levine (1997) for a survey of this literature.
62 The Model
There is an economy inhabited by a measure-one continuum of citizens, a ﬁrm, and an
incumbent government.
We ﬁrst introduce the economic part of the model: Each citizen is endowed with one
capital unit and one labor unit. A subset of citizens own the ﬁrm.6 The ﬁrm hires workers
and borrows capital from the citizens to produce ﬁnal goods Y with the Cobb-Douglas
production technology Y = LαK1−α, where α ∈ (0,1). Citizens supply their labor unit
inelastically, such that L = 1; and the labor market is perfectly competitive. We take the
amount of capital K that citizens lend to the ﬁrm as our measure of ﬁnancial development
(which is consistent with standard empirical measures of ﬁnancial development based on
credits to the private sector). After having produced goods Y and having paid wages w,
the ﬁrm decides whether or not to pay back capital K and its interest debt rK. If it fails
to pay back capital and interest debt, the share λ of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt net of wage payment
is conﬁscated, where λ is a measure of contract enforcement. Aggregate income in the
economy is the sum of domestic production Y and the exogenous natural resource rents Ω.
We now turn to the political part of the model: The incumbent government can choose
the level of contract enforcement λ ∈ [0,1] as well as the level of corruption θ ∈ [0,1 − τ],
where τ is an exogenous tax rate used to ﬁnance government salaries. The government’s
total revenues are (τ + θ)(Y + Ω). We assume that there is a trade-oﬀ between contract
enforcement and corruption. Such a trade-oﬀ may exist for various reasons: First, estab-
lishing and promoting the rule of law, in general, and contract enforcement, in particular,
may be costly. Hence better contract enforcement may leave fewer resources that can po-
tentially be appropriated by the government. Second, appropriating resources may become
more diﬃcult and costly when the rule of law is established. Third, diﬀerent politicians
6Our results do not depend on how large this subset is. They even hold if the ﬁrm is owned by one or
all citizens.
7may be good in fostering contract enforcement and engaging in corruption, respectively,
such that a head of government who primarily appoints ministers that are good in fos-
tering contract enforcement may end up with a cabinet that does poorly in appropriating
resources. Fourth, governments might be time constrained, such that more time devoted
to fostering contract enforcement leaves less time for corrupt activities. For simplicity we
model this trade-oﬀ between contract enforcement and corruption by assuming that the
incumbent government is time constrained, and that its choices of λ and θ must satisfy
λ + θ ≤ 1.7
After the incumbent government’s policy choices and the production of ﬁnal goods,
the citizens can try to oust the incumbent government in midterm elections.8 If they try,
they are successful with probability p, where p is a measure of the quality of political
institutions. Hence, the better the political institutions are, the more likely it is that the
incumbent government gets ousted in midterm elections when the citizens want to oust it.
If the citizens are successful, a caretaker government takes over and pays the corruption
revenues back to the citizens.9 With probability 1−p the incumbent government can stay
in oﬃce even if the citizens try to replace it. We assume that small transaction costs may
accrue if a caretaker government takes over, such that citizens prefer to keep the incumbent
government when (otherwise) indiﬀerent between the two outcomes.
Payoﬀs are as follows: The incumbent government gets the oﬃcial salary and the
corruption revenues if and only if it remains in oﬃce. Hence its payoﬀ is (τ +θ)(Y +Ω) if
it remains in oﬃce, and zero otherwise. The citizens’ payoﬀ consists of up to four diﬀerent
components, which can all be converted into consumption. First, each citizen receives
7While the trade-oﬀ between contract enforcement and corruption is crucial for our results, they do not
hinge on the particular way in which this trade-oﬀ is modeled. Also our results would be similar for any
time endowment less than 2 − τ.
8Midterm elections are a simple way to introduce (potential) accountability into a one period model;
see, e.g., Mukand and Rodrik (2005).
9Results would be unchanged if the caretaker government paid back only some (strictly positive) share of
the corruption revenues, or if it paid back corruption revenues only with some (strictly positive) probability.
8the wage w. Second, each citizen gets a share of the resource rents which is equal to
(1−τ −θ)(Y +Ω) if the incumbent government stays in power, and to (1−τ)Ω otherwise.
Third, each citizen ends up with capital 1 + rK if the ﬁrm repays all capital and interest
debt, and with 1 − K otherwise. Fourth, some citizens may get additional revenues if the
ﬁrm is proﬁtable.
The timing of the game is as follows: First, the incumbent government chooses λ and
θ. Second, the ﬁrm hires labor and capital to produce Y . Third, the ﬁrm decides whether
to pay back capital and interest debt. Fourth, the citizens decide whether to make an
attempt to replace the incumbent government.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We derive our results in three steps. First we derive the equilibrium of the economy
and ﬁnancial development for any λ and θ. Second we derive the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the political game using backward induction. We then discuss how a change
in resource rents aﬀects ﬁnancial development in the politico-economic equilibrium.
As the labor market is perfectly competitive, and the citizens supply their labor inelas-
tically, it holds in equilibrium that L = 1 and w = (1−τ −θ)αK1−α. The ﬁrm’s post wage
payment proﬁt is therefore Π = (1 − τ − θ)(1 − α)K1−α.
The capital market outcomes, i.e., interest rate r and the amount of capital borrowed
K both depend on contract enforcement λ. In particular, citizens never lend so much
capital that the ﬁrm may decide not to repay the capital and its interest debt. Hence,






. Observe that Φ(λ,θ,r)
increases in λ, but decreases in θ and r, and that Φ(λ,θ,r) < 1 for any λ, θ and r ≥ 0.
Hence citizens will never lend all capital, and competition between citizens drives the
interest rate down to zero. Given λ and θ, ﬁnancial development is thus K = Φ(λ,θ,0),
9and domestic production is Y = Φ(λ,θ,0)α. Consequently, K and Y are both increasing
in contract enforcement λ and decreasing in corruption θ.
We now turn to the political game. Having observed the incumbent government’s
choices of λ and θ, and the resulting market outcomes, the citizens try to oust the incumbent
government if and only if the incumbent government is corrupt, i.e., if and only if θ > 0.
The reason is that it is too late for them to undo poor market outcomes due to low λ, but
not too late to get corruption revenues back when θ > 0.
Knowing the eﬀect of its policy choices on market outcomes and the citizens’ political
decision, the incumbent government either chooses the best uncorrupt strategy, i.e., λ = 1
and θ = 0, or it maximizes total revenues (τ + θ)[Φ(λ,θ,0)α + Ω]. These strategies yield
payoﬀs of mu = τ[Φ(1,0,0)α + Ω] and mc = maxθ(τ + θ)[Φ(1 − θ,θ,0)α + Ω], respectively.
The incumbent government prefers the best uncorrupt strategy if mu ≥ (1 − p)mc or,
equivalently, if p ≥ p′ ≡
mc−mu
mc , and the total revenue maximizing strategy otherwise.
Note that p′ ∈ [0,1) as mc ≥ mu > 0. Hence the incumbent government chooses maximal
contract enforcement if political institutions are suﬃciently strong. Otherwise it maximizes
total revenues because it is likely to remain in oﬃce even when engaging in corruption and
choosing low contract enforcement.
We now turn to the eﬀect of higher resource rents Ω on ﬁnancial development in the
politico-economic equilibrium:
Proposition 1 A marginal increase in resource rents Ω reduces ﬁnancial development K
if p < p′, i.e., if political institutions are relatively weak, but has no eﬀect on K otherwise.
Proof: If p ≥ p′, then K = Φ(1,0,0) for any Ω. Hence a marginal change in Ω has no
eﬀect on K. If p < p′, then θ maximizes (τ +θ)[Φ(1−θ,θ,0)α+Ω] subject to θ ∈ (0,1−τ).
In case of a border solution, a marginal change in Ω has no eﬀect on θ and, hence, K =
Φ(1 − θ,θ,0). In case of an interior solution, the optimal θ must satisfy the ﬁrst-order
condition κ ≡ (1 − α)[(1 − θ)(1 − θ − τ) − (2 − 2θ − τ)(τ + θ)] + Ω = 0, and it must hold
10that ∂κ
∂θ < 0. As ∂κ
∂Ω > 0, the implicit function theorem then implies that ∂θ
∂Ω > 0. Since
∂Φ(1−θ,θ,0)
∂θ < 0, the chain rule then implies that ∂K
∂Ω < 0. ￿
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows: If political institutions are strong, the
incumbent government chooses high contract enforcement, which leads to high ﬁnancial
development, independently of the resource rents. But if political institutions are weak,
then the incumbent trades oﬀ the beneﬁt of better contract enforcement, which is higher
domestic production, against the cost of less time available for corrupt activities. As
resource rents increase, domestic production becomes relatively less important and the
incumbent government thus increases corruption and lowers contract enforcement, which
translates into lower ﬁnancial development.
4 Empirical Strategy and Data
We use two diﬀerent panel datasets covering the periods 1970 to 2005 and 1870 to 1940,
and 133 and 31 countries, respectively.10 Our main speciﬁcation uses ﬁve year averages
of our measures of ﬁnancial development, resource rents, political institutions and income.
However we also test the robustness of our results using annual data, three year averages,
and decadal averages. To estimate whether the relationship between ﬁnancial development
and resource rents depends systematically on the quality of political institutions, we use
the following model:
FDit = αi + βt + γ1RRit + γ2Dit−5 + γ3Dit−5 × RRit + φyit + X
′
itΛ + εit, (1)
where FDit is the level of ﬁnancial development in country i averaged over years t − 4
to t, αi is a country dummy variable which indicates the use of country ﬁxed eﬀects, βt
10Due to data limitations, not all speciﬁcations cover exactly 133 countries and in most speciﬁcations,
the panel is unbalanced. Appendix A2 presents a list of countries included in the sample.
11is a year dummy variable controlling for time varying common shocks, RRit are natural
resource rents in country i averaged over years t−4 to t,11 Dit−5 is a measure of the quality
of political institutions or democracy, respectively, in country i averaged over the period
t − 9 to t − 5, yit is log income per capita in country i averaged over years t − 4 to t, and
X′
it is a vector of other control variables.
The motive behind including country ﬁxed eﬀects is to control for time invariant country
speciﬁc ﬁxed factors such as legal origin and social capital.
We are mainly interest in the eﬀect of a change in RRit on FDit. The point estimate of
this eﬀect is γ1+γ3Dit−5. Therefore we focus on the coeﬃcients γ1 and γ3. We expect γ1 to
be signiﬁcantly negative and γ3 to be signiﬁcantly positive. This would imply that there is
a threshold level of Dit−5 below which the eﬀect of resource rents on ﬁnancial development
is negative, and above which the eﬀect is positive.
We use the log of private credit to GDP ratio from Beck et al. (2000) as our measure of
ﬁnancial development (FDit) for the period 1970 to 2005. This measure is an assessment
of credit availability in a country relative to the size of its economy. It takes into account
credit to the private sector from banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. According to
this measure a country is ﬁnancially underdeveloped if there is little credit available for
the private sector. The advantages of using this measure are threefold. First, it suits
our purpose as it captures our notion of ﬁnancial development in the theoretical model,
where ﬁnancial development is deﬁned as the availability of credit to the private sector,
i.e., the ﬁrm. Second, it covers the time period 1970 to 2005 and the largest number of
countries.12 This allows us to use panel data and minimizes the sample selection bias both
across countries and over time. Third, it is also widely used in the literature as a proxy
11Given the unavailability of direct measures of resource rents for the period 1870 to 1940, we use the
share of primary product exports to GDP instead of RRit for this period.
12The original dataset covers the period 1960 to 2007. We are only able to cover 1970 to 2005 because
other variables used are not available for the remaining years.
12for ﬁnancial development.13 Nevertheless, we also use log money and quasi-money (M2)
to GDP ratio, log bank assets to GDP ratio, log bank deposits to GDP ratio, log ﬁnancial
deposits to GDP ratio, log stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, and log bank returns
on assets to GDP ratio as alternative measures of ﬁnancial development.
Log of private credit to GDP ratio varies between -7.4 in Sudan in 2005 and 1.14 in
the Netherlands in 1995, corresponding to ratios of close to zero and around 310 percent,
respectively. The standard deviation in ﬁnancial development between 1970 and 2004
increased from 0.9 to 1.2, suggesting that the ﬁnance gap has increased across countries
over this period. The mean increased from -1.6 to -1.3 suggesting an overall improvement
in credit availability on the average.
For the 1870 to 1940 period, we use log of commercial and savings bank deposits to
GDP as a measure of ﬁnancial development. This data is obtained from Mitchell (1995)
International Historical Statistics. Three separate volumes on Europe; the Americas; and
Africa, Asia and Oceania are utilized. Note that Mitchell (1995) reports deposits and
GDP data in local currency. The ratios are calculated by dividing local currency value of
deposits with GDP measured in local currency. One could argue that deposits are not the
best indicator of ﬁnancial development as deposits may not necessarily get translated into
credit for investments. However it is not unreasonable to assume that deposits and credit
are likely to be correlated. In any case this is the best that we could do to cover the period
1870 to 1940 and 31 countries.14
Our main natural resource measure (RRit) is the log of rents from natural resources
(which include energy, minerals, and forestry) to GDP ratio and is from the World Bank’s
adjusted net savings dataset. It covers the period 1970 to 2005. The rent from a particular
13See, e.g., Beck et al. (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), and Poelhekke
and van der Ploeg (2009).
14Rajan and Zingales (2003) provide some alternatives with numbers on stock market capitalization,
ﬁxed capital formation raised via equity, number of listed companies per million people for 24 countries
for 1913, 1929, 1938 and some later years. However their data is replete with gaps and would reduce our
sample size signiﬁcantly which would make meaningful estimation of the model almost impossible.
13commodity is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between its world price and average extraction costs
both expressed in current US dollars.15 The world price of a particular commodity is global
and only varies over time. The extraction costs however are variable over time and across
countries. We calculate total rents accruing from a variety of natural resources by following
a three step procedure. First, we multiply the natural resource rent per unit of output
of a particular commodity by the total volume extracted of that commodity. Second, we
aggregate them across commodities for a country and a particular year. Third, we divide
them by GDP and average them for ﬁve year periods and take natural logs to smooth out
any noise in the data. Our data shows Switzerland is the least resource intensive country
in 1995 with a value of RRit at -14.8, and Iraq is the most resource intensive country in
2005 with a value of at 0.8. The corresponding ratios of resource rents to GDP are close
to zero and around 220 percent, respectively.
RRit is our preferred measure of natural resource revenues for the following reasons.
First, it is best able to capture our notion of natural resource revenues in the theoretical
model, where these revenues are deﬁned as rents from natural resources. Second, it is
fairly wide in terms of country coverage. Therefore we are able to minimize the risk of
sample selection bias. It also provides a reasonably long time dimension. Third, this
variable is now been used by a number of recent studies (see for example, Ross, 2006;
Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). Fourth, it may be best able
to bypass endogeneity related concerns as it is unlikely that current ﬁnancial development
in a country will aﬀect resource rents as the latter predominantly depend on the stock
of natural resources and exogenous world prices of natural resources. Nevertheless, we
also use lagged RRit to allay concerns of endogeneity. Normalizing resource rent with
GDP may also bring in endogeneity concerns as FDit may aﬀect GDP. To circumvent
that problem we also estimate our model using resource rents and ﬁnancial development
15Hamilton and Clemens (1999) provide a detailed description of this dataset.
14when they are both normalized by population instead of GDP. Furthermore, we also use
GMM estimation method using lagged RRit and lagged Dit−5 as instruments to address
endogeneity and omitted variable concerns.
For the 1870 to 1940 period, we use the log of the primary product exports to GDP
ratio (sxpit) from Clemens and Williamson (2004). They use categories I, II and III of the
Brussels 1913 Commodity Classiﬁcation. These categories are, respectively, live animals,
food and drink, and raw materials or simply-prepared products. The share varies between
0.11 in the United Kingdom in 1870 to 1 in Argentina in 1885. Resource rents are likely to
be positively correlated with a country’s reliance on primary products exports. However we
acknowledge that at best this is only an indirect measure of resource rents. Nevertheless,
given the unavailability of direct measures, it is perhaps the best the we could do to capture
resource rents Ω.
Our measure of democracy and political institutions (Dit−5) is calculated using the
Polity IV database, which is described by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). Dit−5 is the
diﬀerence between the democracy and the autocracy scores in this database, averaged over
the period t− 9 and t − 5 and rescaled such that it ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values
implying better political institutions. It measures the competitiveness and regulation of
political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the
constraints on the executive. Averaged over the sample period, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
are the least democratic countries with average values of Dit−5 = 0. There are various
countries with an average value of 1 including the resource-rich democracies of Australia
and Norway.
This measure suits our purpose because of the following reasons. First, Dit−5 well
captures the notion of the quality of political institutions in the theoretical model, where
this quality is deﬁned as the probability that the citizens can successfully replace the
incumbent government if they wish to do so. Related to this, Dit−5 is ordinal and there-
15fore allows us to distinguish between diﬀerent shades of democracy and the quality of
political institutions, respectively.16 Nevertheless, we also use the fraction of years a coun-
try is democratic since 1950 lagged (dit−5), the freedom house democracy index lagged
(DFHit−5), Boix and Rosato’s (2001) democracy dummy lagged (DDUMit−5), and the
Polity IV democracy dummy lagged (PIV Dit−5) as alternative measures. Second, Dit−5
and all these other lagged measures are perhaps able to address the endogeneity related
concerns. Even though ﬁnancially developed countries are likely to be more democratic,
it is less likely that ﬁnancial development in year t will aﬀect political institutions in year
t − 5. Nevertheless, we also use democracy twice lagged (Dit−10) and Dit−10 × RRit as
instruments for democracy and estimate the model using the Fuller version of Limited In-
formation Maximum Likelihood (LIML) instrumental variable method. The advantage of
using Fuller LIML over standard instrumental variable estimator is that the former works
better even when the instruments are weak. Furthermore, we also estimate the model using
GMM where lagged explanatory variables are used as instruments.
Log per capita income and several other additional control variables are also used in
the study. Detailed deﬁnitions and sources of all variables are available in Appendix A1.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the major variables used.
Finally, there are concerns of multicollinearity and omitted variables that we need to
address in our estimation. First, there is a possibility that a high correlation between
RRit and Dit−5 could inﬂate the standard errors of our estimates. Ross (2001) documents
that natural resource abundance and oil in particular have antidemocratic properties. This
may bring in issues of multicollinearity in our speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd that the correlation
between RRit and Dit−5 is -0.03 and the correlation between RRit and Dit−5×RRit is 0.24.
16Alternatively, there is also a strong view that a simple dichotomy between democracy and non-
democracy is the most appropriate empirical deﬁnition (e.g., Przeworski et al., 2000). However, the
latter certainly involves approximation and may bias estimates (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2009). A related
view is that democratic capital or longer-lived democratic experience is important (e.g., Treisman, 2000;
and Persson and Tabellini, 2006).
16The magnitudes of these correlations are not large enough to cause any serious problem of
multicollinearity. Second, we tackle the issue of omitted variables by controlling for time
varying common shocks, country ﬁxed eﬀects and additional covariates that are expected
to inﬂuence the level of ﬁnancial development.
5 Empirical Evidence
Table 2 presents our main results. In column 1 we look at the unconditional correlation
between resource rents and ﬁnancial development. We notice a statistically signiﬁcant
negative relationship. This suggests that resource rents are associated with low levels
of ﬁnancial development. But this association may be driven by omitted factors (such
as income, political structure, legal structure, culture, geography, time varying common
shocks etc.) inﬂuencing both resource rent and ﬁnancial development. To tackle this issue
in columns 2 and 3 we add log per capita income, country dummies and year dummies.
We notice that the negative relationship survives however the magnitude of the coeﬃcient
falls. To estimate how the eﬀect of natural resources on ﬁnancial development depends
on the quality of political institutions, in column 4 we add the interaction term Dit ×
RRit and Dit. We notice that the negative coeﬃcient on RRit survives, and that the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. To address
endogeneity concerns, in column 5 we use the lagged measure Dit−5 to estimate equation
(1). We ﬁnd that coeﬃcients are very similar. In an average country, resource rents inhibit
ﬁnancial development unless Dit−5 is above the threshold level of 0.9, which corresponds
to a POLITY2 score of around 8. In column 6, we use lagged resource rents RRit−5 to
allay concerns of reverse causation between resource rents and ﬁnancial development, as
ﬁnancial development today is unlikely to aﬀect resource rents ﬁve years ago. Our main
results remain unaﬀected both in terms of magnitude and sign.
17To put the estimates of our main speciﬁcation (column 5) into perspective, let us focus
on Nigeria – a resource rich country (RRNGA2005 = 3.86, i.e., a resource rents to GDP
ratio of almost 50 percent) with weak democratic institutions (DNGA2000 = 0.65, i.e., a
POLITY2 score of 3) and a low level of ﬁnancial development (FDNGA2005 = 2.73, i.e.,
a private credit to GDP ratio of around 15 percent). If ceteris paribus Nigeria’s resource
rents dropped to zero, then FDNGA2005 would increase by 0.21, which is more than one ﬁfth
of a sample standard deviation in FDit. If ceteris paribus Nigeria’s political institutions
improved to match the quality of Botswana’s political institutions (DBWA2000 = 0.95, i.e. a
POLITY2 score of 9), then FDNGA2005 would increase by 0.44, which is almost half a
standard deviation. These examples illustrate that resource rents tend to severely inhibit
ﬁnancial development unless political institutions are strong.
One potential concern is that our preferred measure of the quality of political institu-
tions, Dit−5, could be endogenous. However, the endogeneity problem should not be too
serious as Dit−5 is a lagged measure and less likely to be endogenous than a current mea-
sure. Furthermore, Monte-Carlo evidence shows that the bias of OLS is reduced when an
endogenous variable is interacted with a continuous exogenous variable (Harrison, 2008).
Therefore, the bias of the coeﬃcient on Dit−5 × RRit should be rather small even if Dit−5
is endogenous as RRit is a continuous variable that is likely to be exogenous. Moreover,
as we discuss below, our results also hold when we use long-run measures of the quality of
political institutions, which are even less likely to be endogenous. Nevertheless, we address
the potential endogeneity of Dit−5 and the interaction term Dit−5 × RRit by employing
the instrumental variable approach. The instruments need to be correlated to Dit−5 and
Dit−5×RRit, respectively, and orthogonal to the error term. As it is often the case, ﬁnding
strong and valid instruments is not an easy task. In column 7 we use the twice lagged
democracy measure Dit−10 and the interaction term Dit−10 × RRit as instruments. These
instruments are highly correlated to Dit−5 and Dit−5 × RRit, and it is plausible that they
18are orthogonal to the error term. They are also not weak instruments as they satisfy the
Stock-Yogo criteria. We notice that the coeﬃcients of interest remain highly signiﬁcant
when we use these instruments. In column 8, to further allay concerns of endogeneity, we
estimate the model using Dit−10, RRit−5 and Dit−10×RRit−5 as instruments for Dit−5, RRit
and Dit−5 × RRit, which corresponds to GMM estimation method, and our main results
hold.17
Table 3 checks whether we really pick up the eﬀect of political institutions on ﬁnancial
development. Acemoglu et al. (2008) show that better property rights institutions led to
subsequent expansion of franchise and better political institutions. Therefore it is plausible
that political and property rights institutions are correlated and what we are picking up is
in fact the eﬀect of property rights institutions, not political institutions. To address this
concern in column 2 we replace Dit−5 by lagged expropriation risk (EXPRit−5), which is
a widely used measure of property rights (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Bhattacharyya, 2009). We do not get the same results
which indicates that our main speciﬁcation, which is replicated in column 1, is indeed pick-
ing up the eﬀect of political institutions. To convince ourselves further we use EXPRit−5
as an additional control variable in column 3, and our main result survives. In column 4 we
replace Dit−5 with lagged constraints on the executive (EXCONSTit−5), which is another
variable sometimes used to measure property rights. This measure however is not the best
to capture North’s notion of an extractive state (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Moreover,
EXCONSTit is also from the Polity IV database, and it is one of the components of the
democracy code used to derive POLITY2. Given this deﬁnitional overlap between Dit and
EXCONSTit, it is not surprising that the estimates are similar as our main results. In
column 5 we add EXCONSTit−5 as an additional control variable to our main speciﬁca-
17Following Acemoglu et al. (2001) it has become popular to use settler mortality as instrument for
property rights and, sometimes, political institutions. But since settler mortality is only available as a
cross-section, it cannot be used as instrument in the presence of country ﬁxed eﬀects.
19tion. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on RRit and Dit−5×RRit remain signiﬁcant, suggesting
that the relationship between resource rents and ﬁnancial development indeed depends on
the quality of political institutions.
Table 4 asks the question where this nonlinear eﬀect of resource rents on ﬁnancial
development is coming from. In column 1 we test whether the eﬀect is driven by a particular
year or a group of years. We do this by allowing the interaction term Dit−5 × RRit to be
diﬀerent across time, and we estimate separate year eﬀects. We notice that the eﬀect is
uniform in terms of statistical signiﬁcance over the period 1970 to 2005. The magnitude
of the eﬀect peaks in 1980 and declines afterwards. Overall, the eﬀect is also jointly
signiﬁcant. Developed economies are likely to be democracies and also to have developed
ﬁnancial markets. In column 2, we allow the eﬀect to vary across diﬀerent country-income
groups to test whether it is predominant among developed economies or any other group.
We notice that the eﬀect is uniform across all country-income groups and hence not driven
by developed economies. In column 3 we show that the same holds true if we allow the
interaction term to diﬀer for OECD and non-OECD countries.
In table 5 we add additional covariates into our main speciﬁcation to address the issue of
omitted variables. In column 1 we add foreign aid as an additional control variable, as aid
may lower the desire and need of governments to borrow from ﬁnancial markets. In columns
2-4 we add foreign direct investments, a trade liberalization index, and trade shares, respec-
tively. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that trade liberalization and foreign investments
help easing the grip of the elite on the ﬁnancial market, thus being beneﬁcial for ﬁnancial
development. In columns 5-10 we control for schooling, investments, inequality measured
by the Gini coeﬃcient, terms of trade, commodity prices relative to the GDP deﬂator, and
ﬁnancial openness. Schooling should be beneﬁcial for ﬁnancial development as a better
educated population will be better able to process complex ﬁnancial information thereby
increasing access and participation. Investments generally require credit. Therefore more
20investments should be associated with higher ﬁnancial development. Less inequality should
increase access and participation thereby strengthening ﬁnancial markets. Terms of trade
and commodity prices relative to GDP deﬂator are expected to capture Dutch Disease
eﬀects.18 Lastly, we control for the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness using the index of capital
account openness by Chinn and Ito (2006). Our main results survive in all instances.
Table 6 presents robustness results with alternative samples. Columns 1-5 checks
whether our results are inﬂuenced by any particular continent. We take out Africa, Asia,
Europe, the Americas, and Neo-Europe19 one at a time from our base sample. In columns
6-8 we also omit inﬂuential observations using Cook’s distance, DFITS, and Welsch dis-
tance formulas respectively. Our main results hold in all these alternative samples.
In table 7 we use alternative measures of ﬁnancial development. In columns 1-4 we use
log of M2 to GDP ratio, log deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio, log bank deposit to
GDP ratio, and log ﬁnancial system deposits to GDP ratio, and our main results survive.
In columns 5 and 6, we use log stock market capitalization to GDP ratio and log bank
returns on assets to GDP ratio. The coeﬃcients of interest still show the predicted signs,
but they are no longer statistically signiﬁcant. This may be due to a signiﬁcant reduction
in sample size in these two speciﬁcations. Furthermore, in spite of stock market expansion
globally, stock market exposure till date remains fairly limited in most countries in our
sample. Therefore it is not surprising that we are not ﬁnding statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
in columns 5 and 6. Further, in column 7 we use our preferred measures of resource rents
and ﬁnancial development but on this occasion normalizing them with population instead
on GDP. Our main results survive.
18The ratio of export to import prices is the standard measure of the terms of trade. However, in order
to assess the Dutch Disease impact (or the impact of external price shocks on the economy as a whole),
the price of tradables should also be related to the prices of non-tradables. That is, a commodity export
price shock must be expressed relative to the price of GDP (GDP Deﬂator) in order to assess its Dutch
Disease impact. Hence we use trends in price of commodities relative to price of GDP in addition to terms
of trade.
19Neo-Europe includes all Anglo-Saxon countries outside Europe: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United States.
21In table 8 we test our results using alternative measures of the quality of political insti-
tutions. In column 1 we replace our net democracy measure Dit−5 with the lagged fraction
of years a country has been democratic since 1950 (dit−5), which is a long run measure of
democracy and could be seen as a measure of democratic capital.20 In any year a country
is deemed to be democratic if it registers a positive POLITY2 score. Our main results
survive. In column 2 we replace Dit−5 with the lagged freedom house democracy index
(DFHit−5). The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is still positive and signiﬁcant. The
coeﬃcient on RRit remains negative but is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. In columns
3 and 4 we use the Boix and Rosato Democracy dummy (DDUMit−5) and the Polity IV
democracy dummy (PIV Dit−5), which is equal to one if and only if the POLITY2 score is
positive. Our results survive again. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that our main results
are robust to the use of alternative measures of democracy and the quality of political
institutions.
In table 9 we check what happens if we use diﬀerent data frequency. In columns 1, 2,
and 3 we use annual data, three year averages, and decadal averages, respectively. Results
are very similar as with ﬁve year averages.
In table 10 we test our theoretical predictions using an historical sample of 31 countries
covering the period 1870 to 1940. The dependent variable used here is the log of deposits in
commercial and savings bank to GDP ratio as we are unable to ﬁnd data on private credit
for a large enough sample for this period. Also note that we only have data for log primary
exports to GDP (sxpit) for this period which at best is an indirect measure of resource rents.
Nevertheless, it allows us to take a good crack at testing our theoretical predictions for
this period even though the sample is considerably smaller than the 1970 to 2005 sample.
In column 1 we use our standard measure of the quality of political institutions, Dit−5. We
notice that the coeﬃcients on sxpit and sxpit ×Dit−5 have the predicted signs, but are not
201950 is chosen as a reference year since many countries achieved independence around that time.
Treisman (2000) also uses 1950 as a reference year.
22statistically signiﬁcant. A noticeable feature however is the signiﬁcance and positive sign
of Dit−5, which indicates that democratization and sound political institutions were good
for ﬁnancial development in this period. In column 2 we replace Dit−5 by lagged Polity
IV democracy dummy (PIV Dit−5), a cardinal measure of political institutions. We again
ﬁnd a direct positive eﬀect of political institutions on ﬁnancial development PIV Dit−5,
and we notice that the coeﬃcients on sxpit and sxpit × PIVit−5 have still the predicted
signs and are now statistically signiﬁcant.21 These results suggest that already in the
period 1870 to 1940 natural resource revenues may have hindered ﬁnancial development in
undemocratic countries, but not in democratic ones. However we acknowledge that there
are shortcomings related to endogeneity and sample size which we are unable to address
given data limitations. We leave these issues for future work.
Overall these empirical ﬁndings support our theoretical prediction that resource rents
inhibit ﬁnancial development in countries with poor political institutions, but not in coun-
tries with strong political institutions.
In our theoretical model, natural resource rents inhibit ﬁnancial development in the
presence of weak political institutions by lowering contract enforcement or, more generally,
the quality of contracting institutions. We now make an attempt to test whether resource
rents indeed aﬀect ﬁnancial development through the contracting institutions channel. Due
to the unavailability of reliable measures of contracting institutions in a panel we thereby
have to rely on cross-section data.22 Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2003, 2005) we
use two indices of legal formalism by Djankov et al. (2003) as measures of contracting
institutions.23 The ﬁrst of these measures, called the check measure, describes procedural
21It is not surprising that the dummy works here whereas the continuous measure does not, because the
dummy magniﬁes the variation in political institutions across countries in a small sample of countries with
very little representation from Africa.
22The ICRG measure of repudiation of government contracts is sometimes used in the literature as a
proxy for contracting institutions. This measure however is not appropriate for our purposes as it focuses
on institutions that regulate the relationship between the state and its subjects and not on institutions
that provide the legal framework for contracts between ordinary citizens.
23See Acemoglu and Johnson (2005, p. 955) for an explanation why indices of legal formalism are good
23formalism to recover the money from a bounced check. The second, called the eviction
measure, describes procedural formalism to evict a nonpaying tenant. These measures
both run from 0 to 7, and higher values indicate an ineﬃciently high level of procedural
formalism and weak contracting institutions.
In column 1 of table 11 we estimate our main speciﬁcation using cross-section data.
The results are qualitatively similar to our panel estimates. In column 2 and 3 we add
our two measures of contracting institutions as independent variables. We notice that the
coeﬃcient estimates on RRi2000 and RRi2000 ×Di1995 are no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
The measures of contracting institutions however are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting
that weak contracting institutions tend to lower ﬁnancial development. These results are
consistent with our prediction that the eﬀects of resource rents on ﬁnancial development
are working through the contracting institutions channel. To be more certain, in columns 4
and 5 we look at the relationship between resource rents and contracting institutions. We
ﬁnd that resource rents lead to weak contracting institutions if and only if the quality of
political institutions is low. These results further support our prediction that the eﬀects of
resource rents on ﬁnancial development work through the contracting institutions channel.
6 Conclusions
We study whether natural resource revenues hinder ﬁnancial development, and what role
political institutions are playing in this process. Using a politico-economic model we show
that resource rents inhibit ﬁnancial development if and only if the quality of the political
institutions is relatively poor. To test this prediction, we use a reduced form model and
panel data covering the periods 1970 to 2005 and 1870 to 1940, and 133 and 31 countries,
respectively. We notice that our theoretical prediction is strongly supported by the data
measures of contracting institutions.
24for the 1970 to 2005 period, while the evidence from the rather small sample for the 1870
to 1940 period is less robust. In particular, we ﬁnd that resource rents are negatively
associated with ﬁnancial development in countries that have an average POLITY2 score of
8 or less over the period 1970 to 2005. Our main results hold when we control for the eﬀects
of log income, time varying common shocks, country ﬁxed eﬀects and various additional
covariates. We are able to show that the eﬀect is a demonstrable empirical fact even after
controlling for conventional Dutch Disease eﬀects. It is also robust to various alternative
measures of ﬁnancial development and the quality of political institutions, as well as across
diﬀerent samples and data frequencies.
These ﬁndings imply that resource-rich countries have a tendency to be ﬁnancially
underdeveloped, possibly because governments have less incentives to foster contract en-
forcement when getting large natural resource rents, and because the ﬁnancial sector cannot
prosper without strong contract enforcement. But this tendency can be checked if strong
and democratic political institutions ensure that governments are accountable towards the
people. Therefore, a major implication of our results is that democratization could help to
foster ﬁnancial development in resource-rich countries.
25Appendices
A.1. Data description
Period 1970 to 2005:
Financial development (FDit): Log of private credit by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to
GDP ratio. Source: Beck et al. (2000).
Log of private credit to population: Log of private credit by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
to population ratio. Source: Authors’ calculation using Beck et al. (2000) and WDI Online.
Log of money and quasi-money (M2) to GDP: Log of money and quasi-money (M2) to GDP ratio.
M2 includes currency, demand deposits, traveler’s cheques and other chequeable deposits, retail
money market mutual fund balances, saving deposits (including money market deposit accounts),
and small time deposits. Source: WDI Online.
Log of deposit money bank assets to GDP: Log of deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio.
Source: Beck et al. (2000).
Log of bank deposits to GDP: Log of bank deposits to GDP ratio. Source: Beck et al. (2000).
Log of ﬁnancial system deposits to GDP: Log of ﬁnancial system deposits to GDP ratio. Source:
Beck et al. (2000).
Log of stock market capitalization to GDP: Log of stock market capitalization to GDP ratio.
Source: Beck et al. (2000).
Log of bank return on assets to GDP: Log of bank return on assets to GDP ratio. Source: Beck
et al. (2000).
Resource rents (RRit): log of rents from natural resources as share of GDP. Natural resources
include energy, minerals, and forestry. Rents are deﬁned as the price minus the average extraction
costs. The data are described in Hamilton and Clemens (1999). Source: World Bank Adjusted
Net Savings Dataset.
Log of resource rents to population: Log of rents from natural resources divided by population
size. Source: Authors’ calculation using World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings Dataset and WDI
26Online.
Democracy lagged (Dit−5): Lagged average POLITY2 coding (5 year averages) from the Polity
IV dataset. POLITY2 is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between democracy and autocracy scores. The
original variable varies between -10 and 10. Here we rescale it to 0 and 1 with 1 being the most
democratic. This variable is also used for 1870 to 1940 period. Source: Polity IV.
Fraction of years democratic since 1950 lagged (dit−5): Fraction of years a country has a positive
POLITY2 scores over the period from 1950 to t − 5. Source: Authors’ calculation using Polity
IV.
Freedom House Democracy Index lagged (DFHit−5). Source: Freedom House.
Boix and Rosato Democracy Dummy lagged (DDUMit−5): Source: Boix and Rosato (2001).
Polity IV democracy dummy lagged (PIV Dit−5): Dummy variable equal to 1 if POLITY2 score
is positive in year t − 5, and 0 otherwise. This variable is also used for the 1870 to 1940 period.
Source: Polity IV.
Log per capita income (yit): Log GDP per capita PPP (in current international dollars). Source:
WDI Online.
Executive Constraints lagged (EXCONSTit−5): Measure of institutionalized constraints on the
power of chief executives, ranging from 1 to 7 with higher values representing greater constraints.
Source: Polity IV.
Expropriation Risk lagged (EXPRit−5): Expropriation risk is deﬁned as the risk of “outright
conﬁscation and forced nationalization” of property. This variable ranges from 0 to 10 with higher
values representing lower probability of expropriation. Source: International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG).
Trade Share: Total volume of trade as a share of GDP. Source: WDI Online.
Foreign Direct Investments: Net inﬂow of foreign direct investment as a share of GDP. Source:
WDI Online.
Foreign Aid: Oﬃcial development assistance. Source: WDI Online.
27Sachs and Warner Trade Liberalization Index: Fraction of years open between years t − 4 and t.
Source: Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
Schooling: Average schooling years of the aged over 25 in the total population, measured at ﬁve
year intervals from 1970 to 2000. Source: Barro and Lee (2000).
Investments: Investments to GDP ratio. Source: Penn World Table 6.2.
Gini Coeﬃcient: Inequality measured by Gini Coeﬃcient in percentage points as calculated by
UNU-WIDER. Source: World Income Inequality Database version 2 (WIID2).
Terms of Trade: Net Barter Terms of Trade. Source: WDI Online.
Commodity Price relative to GDP Deﬂator: Commodity Price Index divided by GDP Deﬂator.
Source: Authors calculation using UN sources and WDI Online.
Financial Openness: Index of capital account openness constructed from four dummy variables
that codify restrictions on cross-border ﬁnancial transactions as reported in the IMF’s Annual Re-
port on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Higher values of the index represent
fewer capital account restrictions. Source: Chinn and Ito (2006).
Legal Formalism (Check Measure): Index of formality in legal procedures for collecting on a
bounced check, from 1 to 7. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
Legal Formalism (Eviction Measure): Index of formality in legal procedures for evicting a tenant
for nonpayment of rent, from 1 to 7. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
Period 1870 to 1940:
Log Deposits in Commercial and Savings Banks to GDP: Log deposits in commercial and savings
banks to GDP ratio. Deposits are reported in local currency and therefore divided by GDP
measured in local currency. Source: Mitchell (1995) several volumes.
Log Primary Product Exports to GDP (sxpit): Log of primary products exports to GDP ratio.
Primary products are deﬁned as categories I, II, and III of the Brussels 1913 Commodity Clas-
siﬁcation (recorded in Conference Internationale de Statistique Commerciale, Bruxelles, 1913:
Documents et Proces-Verbaux, Establissements Generaux D’Imprimerie, Brussels, 1914). These
28categories are live animals, food and drink, and raw materials or simply-prepared products re-
spectively. Source: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
A.2 Sample
Period 1970 to 2005:24 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, Colombia,
Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Den-
mark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Kyrgyz Rep., Lao P.D.R, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia Fed., Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montene-
gro, Sierra Leone, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
Period 1870 to 1940: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.
24This sample corresponds to our preferred speciﬁcation reported in column 5 of table 2.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable  Number of 
obs. 
Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Financial Development 
[ it FD ] 
 
Resource Rent [ it RR ] 
 
Democracy Lagged [ 5 it D − ] 
 
5 it it RR D − ×  
 

















      
0.51 





   
 
2.44 
           
 
0.37 





     
 
-14.77 



















Table 2: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Development [ it FD ] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
OLS Estimates  LIML Fuller 1 IV Estimate (GMM) 
Resource Rent 
[ it RR ] 
 
5 it RR −  
 
Democracy 
[ it D ] 
 
5 it D −  
 
it it RR D ×  
 
5 it it RR D − ×  
 
55 it it RR D −− ×  
 
Log GDP 
[ln it y ] 




























































































































































































Instruments    Democracy Twice 
Lagged 
( 10 it D − ), 10 it it RR D − ×    
10 it D − ,  5 it RR − , 





























Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard 
errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All regressions are carried out without an intercept. Sample years are 
every fifth year (averages) from 1970 to 2005.  ‘F-stat on EI’, ‘Partial R
2 EI’, and ‘Stock-Yogo’  indicate F-statistic on excluded instruments, Partial R
2 on excluded 36 
 
instruments and Stock-Yogo critical values respectively. Fuller’s modified LIML estimator with  1 α = (correction parameter proposed by Hausman et al., 2005) is 
used in columns (8) & (9). Reported Stock-Yogo critical values in columns (7), (8) & (9) are the 5 percent significance level critical values for weak instruments 
tests based on, respectively, 30 percent and 5 percent maximal Fuller relative bias. The null of weak instruments is rejected in the case that the F-statistic on the 
excluded instruments exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value/s. Note that the Sargan/Hansen overidentification test for all instruments is not reported as we have an 

























Table 3: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development: Identification 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Development [ it FD ] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Resource Rent [ it RR ] 
 
Democracy Lagged 
[ 5 it D − ] 
 
Lagged Expropriation 




[ 5 it EXCONST − ] 
 
5 it it RR D − ×  
 
5 it it RR EXPR − ×  
 









































































































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 




























Table 4: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development across Time and Income 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Development [ it FD ] 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Resource Rent [ it RR ] 
 
Democracy Lagged [ 5 it D − ] 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year1970 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year1975 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year1980 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year1985 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year1990 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year1995 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year2000 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Year2005 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×High Income 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Middle Income 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Low Income 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Very Low Income 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×OECD 
 
5 it it RR D − × ×Non OECD 
 
Joint test for all interactive 



















































































































Controls:  Log GDP [ln it y ], Country 
Dummies, Year Dummies 
Log GDP [ln it y ], 
Country Dummies, Year 
Dummies, Income 
Dummies 

















Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
intra-group correlation. Sample years are every fifth year from 1970 to 2005. High Income is a dummy for per capita 
GDP in 2000 being 10, 000 constant 1996 international dollars or more; Middle Income for between 5,000 and 10,000; 
Low Income for between 2,500 and 5,000; Very Low Income for less than 2,500. The F-test is the joint test of 
significance of the interaction terms and Year Dummies (for column 1); interaction terms and Income Dummies (for 
column 2); interaction terms and OECD Dummy (for column 3). 39 
 
Table 5: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development: Robustness with Additional Covariates 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Development [ it FD ] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
OLS Estimates 
Resource 




[ 5 it D − ] 
 



























































































Controls:  Log GDP [ln it y ], Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Additional 
Controls 
Foreign Aid  Foreign 
Direct 
Investments 




















































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard 
errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. 


















Table 6: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development: Robustness with Alternative Samples 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Development [ it FD ] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
OLS Estimates 
Resource Rent 
[ it RR ] 
 
Democracy Lagged 
[ 5 it D − ] 
 





























































































































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard 
errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. 
Sample years are every fifth year from 1970 to 2005. In column 2, Neo-Europe includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. In column 6, omit if 
4/ i Cooksd n > ; in column 7, omit if  2/ i DFITS k n > ; and in column 8, omit if  3 i Welschd k >  formulas are used (see Belsley et al. 1980). Here n is the 
number of observation and  k is the number of independent variables including the intercept. The influential observations according to the Cook’s Distance formula 
are DZA1975-2005, AGO2000-2004, BTN1985, BOL1985, BOL2000, BWA1975, BGR1995-2000, BDI2005, CMR1970, CMR1980, CAF1995, TCD2005, 
CHL1975, ZAR1995, ZAR2005, COG1995, COG2005, CZE2005, DNK2005, GNQ1990, GNQ2005, EST1995, GAB1970, GHA1980, HTI1970, IRQ1970-1975, 
KWT1975, LAO1990-2000, LVA2005, LSO2005, MDA1995, MDA2005, MNG2005, NPL1970, NLD1995, NGA1970, PER1990, PER2000, POL1985, QAT2005, 
RWA1970, SAU1975, SVK2000-2005, SDN1975-1980, SDN2005, SWZ2000, UGA1985, and VEN2005. The influential observations according to the DFITS 
formula are all of the above except TCD2005 and QAT2005. Influential observations according to the Welsch Distance formula are DZA1995-2000, AGO2000-
2005, BOL1985, BGR1995-2000, CMR1970, CHL1975, ZAR1995, ZAR2005, COG1995, COG2005, GNQ1990, GNQ2005, IRQ1970-1975, LAO1990-2000, 









Table 7: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development: Robustness with Alternative Measures of Financial 
Development 
  Dependent Variables 
Log of Money 
and Quasi-


















Log of Bank 
Return on 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
OLS Estimates 
Resource Rent [ it RR ] 
 
Log [Rent from natural 
resources/Population] 
 
Democracy Lagged [ 5 it D − ] 
 


































































































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard 
errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. 















Table 8: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development: Robustness with Alternative Measures of Democracy 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Development [ it FD ] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
OLS Estimates 
Resource Rent [ it RR ] 
 
 
Fraction of Years Democratic since 
1950 Lagged [ 5 it d − ] 
 
5 it it RR d − ×  
 
Freedom House Democracy Index 
Lagged [ 5 it DFH − ] 
 
5 it it RR DFH − ×  
 
Boix and Rosato Democracy Dummy 
Lagged [ 5 it DDUM − ] 
 
5 it it RR DDUM − ×  
 
Polity IV Democracy Dummy Lagged 
[ 5 it PIVD − ] 
 




















































































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard 
errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. 




Table 9: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development: Robustness with Alternative 
Data Frequency 
  Dependent Variable: Financial Development [ it FD ] 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
OLS Estimates 
Annual Data  Three Year 
Averages 
Decadal Average 
Resource Rent [ it RR ] 
 
Democracy Lagged [ 5 it D − ] 
 





































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. Sample years are from 































Table 10: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development before 1940 
  Dependent Variable: Log of Deposits in 
Commercial and Savings Bank to GDP 
(1)  (2) 
OLS Estimates 
Log Primary Product Exports to GDP 
[ it sxp ] 
 
Democracy [ it D ] 
 
Democracy Lagged [ 5 it D − ] 
 
Polity IV Democracy Dummy Lagged 
[ 5 it PIVD − ] 
 
it it sxp D ×  
 
5 it it sxp D − ×  
 


























































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. Sample years are every 




















Table 11: Resource Rent, Democracy and Financial Development: Causal Channel 









(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
OLS Estimates 
Resource Rent in 
2000 [ ] 
 
Democracy in 







































































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
intra-group correlation.  
 